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Indian Pediatr 2016;53:S44-S49 |
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India’s Preparedness for
Introduction of IPV and Switch from tOPV to bOPV
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Pradeep Haldar and Pankaj Agrawal
From Immunization Division, Nirman Bhawan, Ministry
of Health and Family Welfare, New Delhi.
Correspondence to: Dr Pradeep Haldar, (Deputy
Commissioner-Immunization), Immunization Division, Room No. 105-D,
Nirman Bhawan, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, New Delhi 110 011,
India.
Email:
pradeephaldar@yahoo.co.in
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Global Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-18 calls for
the ultimate withdrawal of oral polio vaccines (OPV) from all
immunization programs across the world. The phased globally synchronized
withdrawal would begin with type 2 serotype in 2016 through a switch
from trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV) and is associated with
small but real risk of Vaccine Derived Polio Virus (VDPV) outbreaks. To
mitigate this risk, efforts across the world, including India, are
underway that comprise of Inactivated Polio Vaccine (IPV) introduction,
containment of type 2 wild and vaccine strains, securing bOPV supplies,
and surveillance and response protocols for any outbreaks after switch.
Switch implementation in India is particularly challenging as country
has one of the largest cold chain system in world with – 27000 cold
chain points from where tOPV will be exchanged with bOPV and disposed in
short time frame as any use/storage of tOPV beyond switch will
jeopardize the global polio eradication.
Keywords: Endgame strategy, Global Polio eradication, Routine
immunization.
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Global Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic
Plan 2013-18 calls for the ultimate withdrawal of oral polio vaccines
(OPV) from all immunization programs across the world. The phased
globally synchronized withdrawal would begin with type 2 serotype in
2016 through a switch from trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV)
and is associated with small but real risk of Vaccine Derived Polio
Virus (VDPV) outbreaks. To mitigate this risk, efforts across the world,
including India, are underway that comprise of Inactivated Polio Vaccine
(IPV) introduction, containment of type 2 wild and vaccine strains,
securing bOPV supplies, and surveillance and response protocols for any
outbreak after switch. Switch implementation in India is particularly
challenging as the country has one of the largest cold chain system in
world with ~ 27000 cold chain points from where tOPV will be exchanged
with bOPV and disposed in short time frame as any use/storage of tOPV
beyond switch will jeopardize the global polio eradication.
Global polio eradication is now in the final phase,
with wild poliovirus (WPV) type 1 limited to only Pakistan and
Afghanistan since August 2014 with record low cases ever in 2015, WPV
type 2 eradicated globally and no WPV type 3 since November 2012. The
reality of a world free of polio has never been so close. This success
is largely attributable to the widespread use of OPV in routine
immunization (RI) and in mass campaigns globally [1].
Sabin poliovirus strains in OPV replicate in the
intestine of the vaccinated and rarely mutate to cause paralysis in the
recipient or close contacts (known as Vaccine-Associated Paralytic
Polio, VAPP) or mutate to regain both the neurovirulence and
transmissibility characteristics of WPV (circulating Vaccine Derived
Polio Virus, cVDPV) causing outbreaks [2]. In 1999, overall risk of VAPP
in India was estimated to be 1 case per 4.6 million OPV doses. The type
2 virus in tOPV is estimated to cause 100–200 cases of VAPP annually,
accounting for ~26-31% of all VAPP cases [3].
During 2011-2015, almost 90% of globally reported
cVDPV cases (204/230) were associated with the type 2 component of tOPV
[1]. Similarly, out of the total 44 cases of cVDPVs in India since 2009,
41 are due to type 2 Sabin viruses (i.e. >90%) [4]. VDPVs can establish
endemic and epidemic transmission; they are therefore incompatible with
polio eradication [1].
As WPV nears eradication, the risks of OPV i.e.
instances of VAPP and VDPV surpass the number of cases caused by WPV
[5]. Moreover, the type 2 component of tOPV has been found to interfere
with the immune response to types 1 and 3, a concern for achieving
global eradication as type 1 WPV is still in circulation [5, 6]. Since
WPV type 2 has been eradicated globally and majority of cVDPVs and
nearly one third of VAPP are caused by type 2 Sabin strains, the risks
associated with the use of type 2 component of tOPV (OPV2) now outweigh
its benefits [7]. This necessitates the withdrawal of the type 2
component of tOPV through a globally synchronized switch from tOPV to
bOPV – that is, all tOPV use must stop and residual stocks worldwide
should be destroyed as soon as operationally feasible. Once remaining
serotypes (type 1 and 3) of WPV are eradicated, complete OPV cessation
will be required to achieve final goal of global polio eradication [7,
8].
Switch Planning and Risk Mitigation Measures
The Polio Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018 outlines
strategies and timelines for the eradication of both wild and vaccine
polioviruses. Objective 2 of plan deals with IPV introduction, OPV2
withdrawal and RI strengthening and provides global guidance for the
switch [2]. Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) for Immunization
to World Health Organization (WHO) has identified five prerequisites to
track progress toward switch preparedness. These prerequisites include
introduction of at least one dose of IPV; access to bOPV licensed for
RI; implementation of surveillance and response protocols for type 2
poliovirus; completion of poliovirus containment activities and
verification of global eradication of WPV type 2 [9]. In October 2015,
SAGE reviewed these preparations for switch and concluded that the world
is ready for the switch during the low season of polio transmission in
April 2016. Moreover, SAGE reaffirmed that to prevent the emergence of
cVDPVs; the switch must be globally synchronized in all OPV using
countries between two weeks window from 17 April and 1 May 2016 [10,
11]. Accordingly, India has decided National Switch date as 25th
April, 2016. Findings from a dry run conducted in May 2015 in Assam and
Uttar Pradesh to field test and pilot the switch in country has
suggested that switch is operationally feasible in country. Country’s
preparation for OPV2 withdrawal as per SAGE criteria and other
operational aspects of switch has been summarized in Table I.
Table 1 Status of Five Prerequisites and Key Operational Aspects for the Switch from Trivalent OPV to Bivalent OPV
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Prerequisite as per SAGE |
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Country’s Status |
1. |
Introduction of at least 1 dose of IPV into the RI program. |
a) |
6 States introduced single full dose IPV (at 14 weeks of age) from
30th November,2015, 22 States/UTs expected to start IPV around
1st April, 2016 |
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b) |
8 States/UT expected to introduce 2 f-IPV schedule at 6 and 14
weeks in April, 2016. |
2. |
bOPV licensed for use in RI and SIAs
|
a) |
bOPV is in use in country since 2010 in SIAs and is licensed for
use in both RI and SIAs. |
3. |
Implementation of surveillance (AFP, ES) and response protocols
(EPRP) for type 2 poliovirus to detect and interrupt any cVDPV2
transmission that may take place after the switch. |
a) |
AFP rate and adequate stool rate was 10.81 and 86% respectively
in 2015 which is in conformation with the current
international standards.
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b) |
At present there are 23 ES sites in 6 states across the country
[19]. Expansion planned to additional sites in Hyderabad and
Mumbai in 2016. |
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c) |
EPRP is in place and revised regularly. Simulation exercises
were conducted in 12 states from 2013-15 and planned in
remaining states in 2016-17.
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d) |
Global stockpile of mOPV type 2 for cVDPV2 outbreaks post switch
is being maintained and will be made available to country as
required. |
4. |
Completion of Phase 1 containment activities including an
inventory of all facilities holding infectious WPV materials and
implementation of measures to ensure safe handling of residual
type 2 materials (As per GAP-III) |
a) |
As part of Phase –I (preparation for poliovirus type 2
containment) and Phase IIa (Containment of WPV2) activities, all
unneeded WPV2 materials have been destroyed. Needed
materials have been transferred to National Institute of
Virology, Pune (Designated Essential Facility).
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b) |
A National Biosafety Assessment Board has been constituted
comprising of experts from fields like virology, epidemiology,
public health, bio-safety and NRA and has been trained by WHO.
Board Members will validate the quality of containment in
country. |
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c) |
Phase-II b (Containment of Sabin type 2 polioviruses-( will
begin within 3 months of switch) |
5. |
Verification of WPV2 global eradication |
a) |
Global certification of eradication of WPV2 has been done on
20th September, 2015 |
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Operational aspect |
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Country’s status |
1. |
Establishment of management structure for operationalization of
switch |
a) |
National Switch Plan finalized and funding secured for switch. |
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b) |
Immunization Division at MoHFW coordinating activities at
national level. Partners (WHO and UNICEF) providing technical
support to the GoI |
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c) |
State Task Force and District Task Force for Immunization
coordinating activities at state and district level |
2. |
Minimizing tOPV wastage after switch while avoiding stock-outs
and securing bOPV supplies. |
a) |
A high level meeting at MoHFW held in December, 2015 with
officials from NRA, professional bodies, vaccine testing lab,
suppliers and partners.
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b) |
Supply orders of tOPV have been cancelled beyond February, 16.
Procurement for bOPV done and suppliers have been informed.
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c) |
A web based tool and eVIN is being used to update inventory of
polio vaccines from ~ 27,000 cold chain points across the
country. |
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d) |
NRA of India is developing mechanism to control supplies in
private sector in view of switch date. |
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e) |
Professional bodies, local municipal bodies, other Ministries
and Departments (Coal, Power, Petroleum and Natural gas, Defence,
Civil Aviation, Railways, Home Affairs) have been taken into
loop for ensuring switch in all health facilities
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3. |
Trainings and IEC plan |
a) |
National level workshop has been done and cascaded trainings are
being done at all levels
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b) |
IEC material have been developed for both private and public
sector by UNICEF with technical assistance from WHO |
4. |
Validation of Switch |
a) |
National Certification Committee for Polio Eradication has been
entrusted with the task of Switch Validation.
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b) |
Switch monitors have been identified who will verify both public
and private sector |
AFP: Acute Flaccid Paralysis, ES: environmental
Surveillance, MoHFW: Ministry of Health and Family Welfare ,NRA:
National Regulatory Authority, IEC: Information, Education and
Communication. |
Despite careful planning and effective
implementation, the endgame is not risk-free. OPV2 withdrawal is
associated with short term risk of circulating VDPV type 2 (cVDPV2s)
outbreak because of silent transmission resulting from replication and
mutation of type 2 vaccine virus in gut of recently immunized children.
This risk is greatest in the first 6-12 months after cessation and
declines with time as vaccine viruses are unlikely to circulate longer
than a few months after OPV cessation [12]. Studies in Cuba, Indonesia
and New Zealand have demonstrated that polioviruses were not detectable
in environmental or stool samples 2-3 months after last OPV use and
suggest that VDPV is unlikely to establish circulation in situations
with high population immunity [8,12,13].
The long-term risks after OPV2 cessation would be
mainly related to reintroduction of type 2 poliovirus from stocks stored
in research facilities, manufacturing sites, and diagnostic laboratories
[8,12,13]. These stocks are expected to be destroyed or contained in
designated essential facilities, as specified in the current draft of
the WHO Global Action Plan to Minimize Poliovirus Facility-associated
Risk (known as GAP-III). Implementation of GAP-III is considered an
important measure to reduce the emergence of cVDPV2s after the switch
[8,14].
The risk of cVDPV outbreaks is largely related to low
population immunity against particular serotype. A cross-sectional
serologic assessment of immunity to poliovirus in traditional high risk
areas of India in 2014 revealed that overall seroprevalence for Bihar,
Madhya Pradesh and Mumbai were 97.3%, 97.9% and 86.9% for poliovirus
types 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The study also concluded that areas with
low RI coverage and urban migratory clusters have also achieved high
levels of population immunity against all three poliovirus types [15].
According to WHO-UNICEF estimates on immunization, 2014 revision, OPV-3
coverage is 82% in India [16]. Further, no cVDPV outbreak has been
reported in country since 2010 [4]. These findings suggest that country
is maintaining high level of population immunity conducive to rapid
decay of type 2 Sabin virus after switch and to prevent cVDPV
emergences.
Boosting immunity to type 2 polioviruses preceding
the switch with high-quality tOPV supplemental immunization activities
(SIAs) is the cornerstone to reduce the likelihood of cVDPV2 emergence
following the switch [1,10,11]. India has already done two nationwide
mass campaigns in January and February, 2016. An additional SIA using
tOPV and Mission Indradhanush round (MI, see later in this article) has
been planned in April, 2016 in high risk areas. These campaigns in the
backdrop of high seroprevalance will help to prepare the country to
prevent cVDPV2 emergence or spread after the switch.
IPV Introduction in India as a Risk Mitigation
Measure
To prepare for the switch, SAGE recommended in 2012
that at least one dose of IPV to be introduced into RI schedule in all
OPV using countries [9]. Adding a dose of IPV in RI might decrease
incidence of overall VAPP due to all three serotypes by as much as
80-90%. The introduction of one dose of IPV led to the elimination of
VAPP in Hungary [3]. Unlike OPV, immune response to IPV does not vary
significantly between industrialized and tropical developing country
settings [5]. Studies suggest that a single dose of IPV will effectively
close immunity gaps to all 3 poliovirus serotypes in previously tOPV-vaccinated
children. To test the same in India scenario, a recent study in India
assessed a schedule with bOPV (at birth, 6 and 10 weeks) followed by the
co-administration of bOPV and IPV (at 14 weeks) which resulted in
excellent seroconversion rates (nearly 98-99% to poliovirus type 1 and
3, and 69%–78% to type 2). Intestinal mucosal immunity is required to
interrupt the transmission of poliovirus. Two recent studies in India
found that in infants and children with a history of multiple doses of
OPV, a single dose of IPV boosted intestinal mucosal immunity and
reduced the prevalence of excretion after an OPV challenge by 38%–76%,
compared to no polio vaccination. Studies also indicate that IPV is more
effective in boosting intestinal mucosal immunity than OPV among
OPV-immunized individuals [1]. Child malnutrition is a significant
health problem in India (as per NFHS-4 data, 34 % children under 5 years
are underweight) and a recent trial in Pakistan demonstrated that single
simultaneous administration of IPV and bOPV achieved high seroconversion
rate for type 2 in malnourished (84%) as well as normal children (100%)
[8].
These findings form the technical rationale that IPV
will help protect against paralytic polio from type 2 polioviruses
should cVDPV2s emerge, facilitate responses to any cVDPV2 outbreaks
after the switch to bOPV through priming effect, will aid in eradicating
WPV by boosting immunity to types 1 and 3 polioviruses and is likely to
be effective in Indian setting [5,8]. It is imperative to mention that
use of IPV is not primarily meant to prevent emergences of cVPDV2s but
to mitigate the risk of paralytic disease occurrence and spread in case
of any outbreak. [8,17]. In view of these evidences and as per SAGE 2012
recommendations, Government of India decided to introduce IPV in country
[18].
Almost all countries using only OPV at the start of
2013 had committed to introduce IPV before the end of 2015 and ~90
including India have already introduced IPV as of 1st
February, 2016 [19]. Rapid IPV introduction across many countries,
introduction of IPV in SIA of endemic countries, requirement of
maintaining a stockpile of IPV for post switch VDPV emergences and
global constraints to scale up the production has led to worldwide
shortages of IPV [19]. In view of IPV supply shortages, phase-wise
introduction of IPV was planned in the country. In the first phase, IPV
has been introduced in 6 States in India on 30th
November, 2015. IPV was planned to be introduced in remaining states in
April, 2016. However, due to continued global shortages and amidst the
evidence from Cuba and Bangladesh indicating that the "prime-boost"
effect of 2 fractional doses (1/5th
of full IPV dose) at 6 and 14 weeks offer better protection than a
single full dose, the Indian Expert Advisory Group for polio eradication
in February, 2016 recommended GoI to go for fractional dose IPV (f-IPV)
introduction in selected States/UTs [1, 20]. Accordingly, GoI has now
planned for f-IPV introduction in 8 States/UTs in April, 2016. Remaining
22 States/UTs are expected to introduce single full dose IPV from 1st
April, 2016. As the country has high level of population immunity
against all three types of polioviruses (to prevent emergence of
cVDPV2s), phased introduction of IPV is not an impediment to OPV2
withdrawal [8].
India has also planned to conduct operational and
immunogenicity studies in States with f-IPV introduction to further
decide on the continuation and/or expansion of the use of f-IPV in the
country. Other operational aspects of IPV introduction such as
minimizing vaccine wastage, route and dose considerations, recording and
reporting tools, trainings and communications are outlined in Box
1.
Box 1 Operational Aspects of IPV Introduction |
A. Minimizing IPV wastage
a) Open vial policy is applicable for IPV
b) 5 dose presentation to States/UTs with
predominantly hilly or hard to reach areas
c) Message that Shake test is not
applicable has been incorporated in Operational guidelines and
training package
B. Route and dose considerations
a) Site for IPV will be anterolateral
aspect of right thigh (for single full dose) or right upper arm
(for fractional doses). This will help in easy recall of IPV
administration in case MCP card is not available.
b) 1 full dose (0.5 ml intramuscular) at
14 weeks or 2 Fractional doses (0.1 mL intradermal each dose) at
6 & 14 weeks.
C. Recording and reporting tools
a) HMIS, MCTS and MCP cards are being
modified to incorporate IPV
b) Monitoring formats have been modified
to capture data on IPV introduction
D. Trainings and communication:
a) National level training has been done.
Cascaded training going on in States/UTs where IPV to be
introduced
b) IEC material and plan has been
prepared
HMIS:Health Management Information System, MCTS: Mother and
Children Tracking System, MCP: Mother and Child Protection card.
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Strengthening Routine Immunization
Strengthening the RI system that distributes and
administers IPV will help to maximize the impact of IPV use. Though mass
polio campaigns achieve high coverage, Universal Immunization Programme
fully immunizes only about 65.3% of children [21]. In order to address
this gap, Mission Indradhanush was launched on 25th
December, 2014 which aims to rapidly increase immunization coverage in
the country to >90% by 2020. Two phases of MI have already been
completed in 2015 where nearly 20 lakh children were fully immunized.
Phase-3 of MI will start from 7th
April, 2016, which not only will help in boosting type 2 immunity before
switch but also in increasing IPV coverage.
Conclusion
IPV introduction and tOPV to bOPV switch is a
landmark public health endeavor which will build a positive legacy.
India is not only prepared to make it a safe venture but also taking a
leadership e.g., fractional dose introduction of IPV has never been done
in any country’s programme, and India was the first country in world to
conduct dry run for switch. Country is utilizing the opportunity of
switch to develop and test novel mechanisms in vaccine and logistic
supply chain. Endeavor of polio endgame has refuelled liaison with
Ministries/departments other than health and National regulatory
authorities, for conducting switch in a risk free manner, which would
also lay foundation for the eventual global cessation of all OPV.
Contributors: PH: substantial contribution to
design conceptual framework of article, revising it critically for
important intellectual content and analysis of collected data; Concept
and design of article, drafting the article, revision of article and
compilation, collation and analysis of collected data.
Funding: None; Competing interest: None
stated.
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