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Indian Pediatr 2009;46: 115-121 |
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Pandemic Influenza: Imminent Threat,
Preparedness and the Divided Globe |
Sanjay Chaturvedi
From the Department of Community
Medicine, University College of Medical Sciences, Delhi, India.
Correspondence to: Prof
Sanjay Chaturvedi, Department of Community Medicine,University College of
Medical Sciences and GTB Hospital, Dilshad Garden, Delhi 110 095, India.
E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract
With generic consensus on certainty of an impending
influenza pandemic, concerns are mounting about its devastating global
impact. Preparedness and preventive approaches adopted by the nation
states are polarised between resource rich and resource challenged
countries. India has, rightly, taken a middle path. It seems that the
non-pharmaceutical interventions would be the only preventive modality
available in large parts of world. Production of any pandemic vaccine
would take a minimum of 6 months after isolation of novel virus, and
antivirals may not be available where they are required most. Efforts to
create a universal pool of resources and stockpiles of antivirals,
antibiotics and vaccines for use in first affected countries need to be
strengthened with urgency.
Keywords: Bird-flu, Influenza, Pandemic.
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T he global health
leadership is preparing itself for the impending threat of an influenza
pandemic. There seems to be a generic consensus on the certainty of a
pandemic within a short period from now - and a substantive historical as
well as epidemiological evidence supports this prediction(1).
What looms large
Concerns are mounting that the epicenter of the
outbreak could be the Asia-Pacific region(2). Widespread emergence of
avian influenza virus (A/H5N1) for which humans lack immunity and the
virus having shown replicability and disease causation in humans is seen
as a prerequisite build up. Availability of an intermediate like pig,
thought to be required to make H5N1 transmission to human beings, creates
a genetic-reassortment vessel. The only missing piece in this ecological
fuse is a virus-strain capable of efficient human to human transmission.
Emergence of such a virus is widely accepted as a matter of time(3). We
are already in a pandemic alert period (Phase 3). The protean nature of
H5N1 genome could transform it into the source of next pandemic(4).
Historically, there have been 10 pandemics of Influenza A in past three
centuries. Today, with 6.5 billion world population - more than thrice
that in early twentieth century - even a milder pandemic could kill
several millions.
However, this apparent consensus is not without contest
- at least in quantitative sense. Model based extrapolations of 1918-20
Spanish influenza (A/H1N1), which killed 30-100 million people worldwide
(including 7 million in India), indicate that an estimated 62 million
people would be killed by a similar pandemic this time(5,6) and 96% of
these deaths would occur in developing world(1). Laboratory evidence
suggests that a pandemic caused by current H5N1 strain is likely to mimic
Spanish influenza of 1918 and could lead to 180-360 million deaths if we
translate those mortality rates to current world population(3). On the
other hand, it has also been argued that these projections are
'counter-intuitive' at places and the impact of pandemic may be lesser in
those instances(7). Resource rich and technically proactive nations may
fare better than they did in 1918. Contemporary pandemic can also be
naturally more muted, as was the case with 1957 and 1968 pandemics.
Predictive accuracy of modeling exercises has always had its detractors,
and it is argued that models only help us organize our data and thoughts -
nothing more. At the most we can say that the possible effects of a
contemporary pandemic influenza, when it happens, would have devastating
consequences for the world.
The Response
Preparedness and preventive approaches are polarized
between resource rich and resource challenged countries. Commitment of the
govern-ments in most European and North American countries is strong and
level of preparedness is broadly good(8,9). At the probable epicenter —
the Asia-Pacific region, variance on account of strategies is quite
visible amongst rich and 'not so rich' countries. China, Thailand, and
Vietnam have set out a vision to strengthen future capacity in
preparedness planning, while Australia, New Zealand, and Hong Kong are
aiming mainly at harnessing available resources such as stockpiled
antivirals and vaccines(2). On the other hand, many underprivileged
countries in this region lack a future strategy or plan to deal with the
looming pandemic.
Indian scenario
India has tried to take a middle path. Largely, its
strategy is comparable to those of resource challenged countries but has
also preserved stockpiling components. The ‘Influenza Pandemic
Preparedness and Response Plan’ of India(10) emphasizes on phase-wise
preparedness. Emergency Medical Relief division of Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare is the nodal agency for planning, coordinating,
implementing and monitoring of preparedness and response. The National
Institute of Communicable Diseases (NICD), which has a dedicated Avian
Influenza Monitoring Cell with round the clock call centre, conducts the
surveillance. National Institute of Virology, Pune, a World Health
Organization (WHO) reference laboratory, provides the laboratory support
along with NICD. For the drug oseltamivir, preparatory work for bulk
production and procurement is on - and though inadequate, about one
million doses are in stock (procured-2006, expiring-2011). Serum Institute
of India is one of the institutions identified by WHO for manufacture of
vaccine for use during the pandemic.
Transnational strategy to contain the initial emergence
of pandemic influenza
This is going to be an extraordinary public health
intervention, if required, through international efforts and
collaboration. WHO has recently come out with a protocol on rapid
operations to contain the initial emergence of pandemic influenza(11,12).
Under this, there is provision that concerned national authorities and WHO
would jointly assess all relevant technical, operational, and political
factors to determine if: (i) there is compelling evidence to
suggest that a novel influenza virus has gained the ability to transmit
easily enough from person to person to initiate and sustain community
level outbreaks and, if so (ii) are there any compelling reasons
why a containment operation should be deferred. Proposed strategy
geographically divides the outbreak area into ‘containment zone’ and a
surrounding 'buffer zone'. The containment zone would constitute
geographical area and population harboring the ‘index cluster’, where
widespread antiviral medications for treatment and prophylaxis, movement
restrictions, and non pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) would be used to
restrict the virus from spreading beyond the zone. NPIs would include:
isolation of ill persons, voluntary quarantine of contacts, social
distancing measures such as school closures and cancellation of mass
gatherings, other measures to minimize person density (e.g. staggered work
and market hours), and community-wide practice of hand and respiratory
hygiene. This would be to reduce the possibility that a noninfected person
will come into contact with a person ‘infected by’ and ‘infectious with’
pandemic influenza. The buffer zone would be simultaneously subjected to
an intensive active and complete surveillance for possible ‘break-through’
cases, to evaluate whether the containment operation is succeeding. In
both zones, emphasis will be placed on containment communications to
different stakeholders.
Inherent Riddles
There are three distinct epidemiological domains
requiring outbreak alertness and response - ‘seasonal human influenza’;
‘avian influenza in birds with spill over human infection’; and the
‘pandemic influenza’. This creates a difficulty not only in risk
communication and community awareness but also at the levels of health
care providers and multisectoral partnership. During the initial stages of
pandemic, two things would be extremely critical: (i) the decision
to launch rapid containment exercise, and (ii) the process of
declaration of pandemic (phase 6). Containment would not be possible if
the local authorities do not support the operation or it is not feasible
because of security reasons(12). Besides this, determining the size and
shape of containment and buffer zones would involve several operational
factors such as natural and administrative boundaries, infrastructure, and
essential supplies. Rapid containment is time sensitive and the window of
opportunity is going to be narrow. Today’s civil aviation carries more
than 2 billion travelers a year, enabling the inter-continental transport
of a novel virus in a matter of hours. We had a close shave with severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003, which cost Asian countries an
estimated US$ 60 billion of expenditure and business losses, besides
tremendous impact on health and health systems. Quarantine measures, which
were extremely successful in SARS are unlikely to work here considering a
much higher communicability of influenza(13). Models are heavily dependent
on basic reproduction number (R 0) of
the new virus for several predictions and the containment would be very
difficult if the R0 exceeds 1.8(14). The pandemic may last from one to
three years, and we should be prepared for multiple waves. Subsequent
waves may be deadlier than the first one and are likely to hit us when the
health systems are exhausted logistically.
Distribution, spectrum and outcome of disease
In 1918, more than half the deaths occurred in largely
healthy individuals of 18-40 years and were caused by virus induced
cytokine storm leading to acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS)(15).
Since this pandemic was also associated with the avian virus (A/H1N1), one
is tempted to force old data to contemporary settings. However,
epidemiological domains do not interact mathematically, and predictions on
the course and outcome of disease would remain unreliable. Best we can do
is to analyze information from recent human cases of avian influenza
confirmed from Asia Pacific, Africa and Europe. With 391 total human cases
and 247 deaths (till 16th December 2008), overall case fatality rate is
more than 60 per cent. Majority of cases have occurred among children and
below 40 adults, and the mortality was highest between 10-19 years.
Primary viral pneumonia was the cause of death in most of the cases – not
the superinfection with bacteria. This data too is unsuited for
extrapolation in pandemic situation. The clinical spectrum of human cases
of H5N1 is constructed on records of hospitalized patients. Frequencies of
subclinical infection, milder illness, and atypical presentation (e.g.,
encephalopathy and gastroenteritis) have not been measured, but case
reports indicate that each of them exists(16). There are some other
worrisome realities to be factored in the equation. What shall be the
impact of comorbidities such as malnutrition, diabetic mellitus, HIV, and
tuberculosis, is only a matter of informed guess. Secondary bacterial
pneumonia may still contribute significantly to the death toll. An
equitable antibiotic supply will affect the impact of bacterial
superinfection. A worldwide effort for antibacterial vaccination
especially to achieve universal pneumococcal immunization has also been
advocated(7). However, with present level of preparedness, this looks
unrealistic.
Assessment and planning for surge capacity
Whether we would (or would not) have a surge capacity
for health care, food and other supplies is not going to be a simple
question of low income and high income countries. Pandemic situation may
act as a leveler. Even in the USA, most patients needing ventilator would
not have access to it(3). Health care providers would fall sick and die at
similar rates, or even higher than those in general public. Immune
survivors of initial wave among the health workers may be the only trained
personnel left. Going by the experience with SARS, some health workers
would not show up for duty. Mass voluntarism may be the last rescuer but
if not suitably trained well in advance, this highly motivated,
quasi-informed and largely uncoordinated cadre may even end up creating a
chaos.
Antivirals
In spite of an apparent agreement on stockpiling the
antivirals, the jury is still out on their efficacy, formulary and
modality of deployment. WHO recommends their judicious use(17), while a
Lancet editorial opines that the antiviral drugs are expensive and not
effective enough(13). Some experts suggest that as long as resistance does
not become a major issue, prompt use of neuraminidase inhibitors
(oseltamivir, zanamivir, and peramivir) should substantially reduce
mortality(18). In the light of emerging evidence that H5N1 can develop
resistance to oseltamivir, it is proposed that stockpiling an alternate
antiviral could provide a second line of defence(19). How big should be
the stockpile of antivirals has also been a matter of intense debate. If
the R 0 of the new virus is below
1.8, a Thailand-based model predicts that a stockpile of 3 million courses
of antiviral drugs should be sufficient for containment. Effectiveness
will depend critically on quick detection of clinical cases and the speed
with which antivirals can be made available to the geographical area and
target subjects(12). Stockpiling the items that have a shelf life - like
medicines and vaccines-demands an ongoing systems support. Most vaccines
would expire in 1-2 years and most antivirals in 5 years. This would
require periodic replacements of stockpiles and may also result in heated
political and public debates on perceived ‘wastage’.
Vaccination
Immunization may be tactically used by some resource
rich and technically proactive states but for the low and middle income
countries (LMICs), this is not going to be an available option. Production
of the present seasonal influenza vaccine is based on conventional
egg-based manufacturing process, where we need more than 6 months and 350
million chicken eggs to supply 300 million doses(3). This process needs to
be urgently replaced with cell culture technology for a higher and faster
antigenic yield. Moreover, H5 and H7 subtypes cannot be made by standard
methods since they are rapidly lethal to chick embryos. A suitable
immunological priming of the population might be a useful strategy in
impeding the genesis of a pandemic, and this creates the need and utility
of a ‘pre-pandemic vaccine’. Those prepared from earlier strains and
stockpiled might be poorly matched to a novel virus because of antigenic
diversity of currently circulating H5N1 viruses. Effective adjuvants might
offer an answer. A trial of MF59-adjuvented subunit H5N3 vaccine has
demonstrated the third dose induced cross-reactivity to a range of H5N1
variants. It remains to be investigated whether whole-virion vaccines can
induce broad cross-reactive responses(20,21). Production of a 'pandemic
vaccine' would take a minimum of 6 months after isolation of the
circulating novel virus. Given the combined capacity of all international
vaccine manufacturers, production during next 6 months would be limited to
less than a billion monovalent doses. Since two doses would be required
for protection, it would immunize only 500 million people-approximately
14% of world population(3). Over 85% would remain unimmunized - even after
a year of pandemic.
Non-pharmaceutical interventions
Since a pandemic vaccine may not be available for
initial 6 months, and the antivirals may not be accessible in required
quantity, the NPIs would be the only intervention available at most of the
places of outbreak. This is going to be the most likely scenario in India.
Available evidence suggests that NPIs can delay the disease transmission,
blunt the peak of epidemic and head off the pandemic by decreasing the
overall burden(22,23). However, there is no India specific data from
previous pandemics to determine which of the several NPIs would be most
effective. All feasible NPIs will have to be deployed together.
Suppose there is no ground zero or distinct epicenter -
the way we wish to see it in war-games!
Most of our strategies are based on certain assumptions
and they largely revolve around a hypothetical ground zero or epicenter.
What if it doesn't happen the way we foresee it? We need to take
cognizance of the fact that stopping the development of a pandemic may not
be possible in such a scenario. For instance, a newer virus may emerge
simultaneously in several loci-making containment operations quite
unattainable. This is also anticipated that no single measure can be
applied successfully everywhere and in all the events, no single
containment measure by itself will be sufficient to stop the spread of
novel virus. Nonetheless, these combined measures applied together could
retard the genesis of a pandemic.
Dynamics between health, veterinary and agriculture
sectors
Most communicable diseases of human beings that have
emerged in last two decades have had an animal source. Therefore, the
streamlining of the knowledge transfer and operational coordination
between the departments of veterinary sciences, animal husbandry, wildlife
and health is going to be absolutely crucial while developing early
warning system and response. Such coordination can not be taken for
granted even in the developed countries. The failure to prevent the
outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Japan is a case
under scanner where bureaucrats in each of these ministries, while
ignoring the common objective, fiercely protected their own turf.
Blame-game was in plenty, without enough exchange of information(24).
Strengthening of these linkages is even more crucial in LMICs. Mass
culling of poultry birds also raises several issues. Of them, spot or
early compensation and local supply of food substitutes need to be
immediately addressed to ensure people's support for the interventions.
The Class Divide
Mathematical models may prove to be inaccurate, but
their home work certainly underscores the fact that glaring health
inequity is hardly any lesser now than in 1918, and the technical advances
of a century are unlikely to help much of the developing world in any
contemporary pandemic. Sufficient stocks of antibiotics, antivirals and
pandemic vaccines would not be available to most of the resource
challenged countries. We are comparing the impact of a future pandemic
with that of one in early twentieth century - and even the war-game
results are an indictment of global inequity in health care(18).
Stockpiles of vaccines and antivirals may expire and go waste in countries
where they are not urgently required but are unlikely to be available to
people who would need them the most. Politics and governance of LMICs
along with their civil society movements must also share a significant
portion of this blame.
Need for strengthening the global pool of resources for
use in first affected countries
It is not that the solutions are not available. If we
were to arrest or slow down the earliest outbreaks, delivery of the
antivirals and vaccine stockpiles to the first sites - regardless of the
domestic resources of affected countries-would be in everyone’s interest.
Respective governments of the resource rich countries need to realize
this, while strengthening WHO’s efforts to maintain a global pool of
antiviral stockpiles and real time knowledge transfer on pandemic
vaccine(11,12). We also need to have a properly mandated international
protocol to this effect, besides having nation specific plans. New
International Health Regulations (IHR) may have a substantive role to
play. It is to be ensured that, in global crisis, major political actors
are driven by people's interest - not by power and privileges of select
classes and regions. However, considering the present policies on
oseltamivir stockpile and pre-pandemic vaccine, a positive public health
internationalism doesn't seem to be evolving fast enough. NPIs may be the
only available modalities of control for most of the people in most parts
of the world, cutting edge medical developments of a century
notwithstanding.
Forced optimism would be an insult to evidence
The author is not informed enough to punctuate such
open issues with conclusions or certitude. Nevertheless, possibilities
paint a scary picture. If the pandemic were to occur tomorrow, it will
savagely expose the class divide of the modern world instead of forcing a
global solidarity. Causal factors and context might have changed but on
the score of access to quality care and empowerment, we are the way we
were in 1918. Science and civil society have taken several people to
places but for a vast majority of the world, the more things changed the
more they remained the same. In such a milieu, for a person on the street
in Asia, cynicism may well be a rational idea. Forced optimism would be an
insult to evidence — and a sacrilege to science itself.
Funding: None.
Competing interests: None stated.
Key Messages
• There seems to be a generic consensus on the
certainty of an influenza pandemic, in a short period of time from
now, with devastating global impact.
• Response and strategic approaches are polarized
between resource rich and resource challenged countries. India seems
to have, wisely, taken a middle path.
• If the pandemic were to occur tomorrow, it will
savagely expose the class divide of the modern world instead of
forcing a global solidarity.
• Since a pandemic vaccine - the best possible
intervention - may not be available for initial 6 months, and
antivirals may not be accessible in required quantity, the
non-pharmaceutical interventions would be the only preventive
modality available at most of the places of outbreak.
• There is a need for strengthening efforts to create a global
pool of resources and stockpiles of antivirals, antibiotics and
vaccines for the first affected countries. |
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